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INTRODUCTION: BROWN IS DEAD? LONG LIVE BROWN !
DENISE C. MORGAN*
Race is our national obsession.  We are endlessly thinking
about it, and trying not to think about it.  It affects how we regard
one another in public, and intrudes into our most private mo-
ments.1  We may not be able to define it,2 but we think we know it
when we see it — and that makes all the difference in the world.
Race is far more powerful than the invisible hand of the market in
shaping our destinies.3
For lawyers and racial justice activists, the national obsession
with race frequently manifests itself in a preoccupation with Brown
v. Board of Education.4  That certainly is true in my case.  For the
fifteen years since I graduated from law school, it has been virtually
impossible to get me to stop thinking, talking, and writing about
Brown.  My family, friends and students will attest that I have strong
feelings about the case.
My obsession with Brown stems, in part, from my personal his-
tory.  In 1971 when I started second grade at a private school on the
Upper East Side of Manhattan, no Black child had ever graduated
from that institution (Brown may be fifty years old  but, real school
integration is significantly younger since it can be measured by my
lifetime).  When I first went into teaching I had the good fortune of
* Professor of Law, New York Law School.  Thanks to Ann Macadangdang,
NYLS ‘05 for her thorough and careful research assistance.  I would also like to thank
the members of the New York Law School Law Review who worked so hard on this volume.
1. See, e.g., RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE
AND ROMANCE (2003); Note, Racial Steering in the Romantic Marketplace, 107 HARV. L. REV.
877 (1994); JUNGLE FEVER (Universal Studios 1991).
2. Year after year the students in my Race and American History class are
stunned to discover that they do not know how to define race and that they are uncer-
tain how to prove what race they are.  Their discomfort with those discoveries is not
lessened by the fact that they are in good company. See, e.g., United States v. Thind, 261
U.S. 204 (1922); St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
3. See IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND
GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001) (arguing that race-contingent decisionmaking occurs
in retail markets); Ian Ayres, Is Discrimination Elusive?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2419 (2003)
(responding to reviews of PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (hereinafter “Brown I ”).
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working with the woman who was the first Black child to attend that
school.  Even with the support of a farsighted and uncompromising
headmistress, her experience there was harrowing.  I had a much
easier time following in her footsteps and those of a few other Black
children before me.  But, even at the age of six, I understood that
part of my mission there was proving that I, a little Black girl from
the Bronx, belonged in that formerly all-White place.  The imple-
mentation of Brown relied on similar commitments from hundreds
of thousands of children of color and their families.5  That Su-
preme Court case touched our lives and permanently affected our
senses-of-self (for good and for bad). Brown is not an abstraction in
my mind — it is my childhood.
So, maybe that is why I am obsessed with the case.  Whatever
the reason, thinking, talking, teaching about the issues raised by
Brown has been my life’s work.  As a champion of racial justice and
someone who values racial variation in her daily life — I have found
that there is no escaping thinking about it.  But, here is the funny
part: the more I think, talk, teach, write, and litigate Brown, the
more questions I have about the case.  Is it a case about race or
about education?6  Is it animated by a belief in color-blindness or
does it articulate an anti-subordination principle?7  Is race discrimi-
nation in public education a tort or is it more than just that?8  Is
separate really inherently unequal or is integration only desirable
for instrumental reasons — for example, because it reduces con-
centrated poverty, the factor most closely associated with educa-
tional failure?9  Can power ever be made to yield power by
encouragement or legal coercion?  In fact, I have come to a place
5. See, e.g., MELBA PATILLO BEALS, WARRIORS DON’T CRY: A SEARING MEMOIR OF
THE BATTLE TO INTEGRATE LITTLE ROCK’S CENTRAL HIGH (1994); LORENE CARY, BLACK
ICE (1992).
6. See Denise C. Morgan, What’s Left to Argue in Desegregation Law?: The Right to
Minimally Adequate Education, 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 99, 106-08 (1991).
7. See Denise C. Morgan, Finding a Constitutionally Permissible Path to Sex Equality:
The Young Women Leadership School of East Harlem, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 95, 97-101
(1997).
8. See Denise C. Morgan, The New School Finance Litigation: Acknowledging That Race
Discrimination in Public Education is More Than Just a Tort, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 99, 154-59
(2001).
9. See Denise C. Morgan, The Less Polite Questions: Race, Place, Poverty and Public
Education, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 267, 278-81 (1998).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-4\NLR409.txt unknown Seq: 3  3-MAY-05 15:23
2005] INTRODUCTION 1031
where I see Brown as something of a Rorschach Inkblot test: what
we see in the case says at least as much about ourselves as it does
about the case itself.10
There are some moments when I reflect on the Brown decision
and it makes me feel proud — even patriotic.  Those moments hap-
pen most often when I am teaching or speaking to a mixed-race
audience.  I look around and think that such a group would not
have gathered together without the impetus of Brown.  While the
causal linkage between today’s mixed-race gatherings and any sin-
gle historical event must be indirect, it is unlikely that we would
have been able to dismantle the infrastructure of Jim Crow to the
extent we have in the absence of the Brown decision.  Without
Brown would there have been a 1964 Civil Rights Act or a 1965 Im-
migration and Nationality Act?  Without the Supreme Court’s vali-
dation of anti-racism in that case, would personal racial attitudes
have changed to the extent that they have?  Without an official na-
tional commitment to integration, how much further short of the
goal of equal educational opportunity would we have fallen?
In those moments, I see Brown as the Supreme Court’s invita-
tion to Americans (especially White Americans) to be their better
selves.  The case was an invitation to make democracy real by mak-
ing equal citizenship real.11  It was an invitation to allow public edu-
cation to live up to its revolutionary potential — to function as an
engine of intergenerational mobility so that children can succeed
socially, politically and economically irrespective of their parents’
station in life.12  In those moments, I remember that although we
are not all the way there, we have made tremendous strides towards
achieving those goals since the Jim Crow era.  In those moments I
understand that without a vision of a just society and moral guide-
posts, we are lost.  In those moments, Brown looks like one such
guidepost.
10. See, e.g., WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID (Jack M.
Balkin ed., 2001).
11. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 5 (1996) (“According to republican political theory, . . . sharing in self-rule
. . . means deliberating with fellow citizens about the common good and helping to
shape the destiny of the political community.  But to deliberate well about the common
good requires . . . a knowledge of public affairs and also a sense of belonging, a concern
for the whole, a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake.”).
12. See Morgan, supra note 9.
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But, that is not all that I see in the inkblot of the Brown case.
There are other moments when I remember that we Americans like
inequality in our education system.13  At the same time as most of
us believe that children are entitled to the type of educational op-
portunity that will allow them to succeed or fail on their own mer-
its, we just as firmly believe that their parents should be rewarded
for their hard work and success.  Unfortunately, what feels to most
parents like protecting their children by passing on the advantages
of their labors has the effect of more deeply entrenching the status
quo hierarchy.
This realization leads to a darker set of thoughts about Brown.
I remember that many Americans took that case not as an invitation
to be their better selves, but as an invitation to massive resistance
and continued violent oppression of people of color.14  Indeed, it is
hard for me to read Brown II 15 without seeing the Court’s ambiva-
lence about living up to the promises it made in Brown I — the
Whites who stubbornly and violently resisted school integration cer-
tainly saw that ambivalence.16  I also remember that the Supreme
Court was very slow to make it clear that it was serious about Brown.
It was not until Green v. County School Board was decided fourteen
years later that the Court mandated integrated public schools.17
Then, the Court was very quick to renege on the promise of
13. See Denise C. Morgan, The Devil Is in the Details: or Why I Haven’t Yet Learned to
Stop Worrying and Love Vouchers, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477 (2003); JENNIFER L.
HOCHSCHILD & NATHAN SCOVRONICK, THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE PUBLIC Schools 2
(2003) (“Most Americans believe that everyone has the right to pursue success but that
only some deserve to win, based on their talent, effort, or ambition . . . . The paradox
stems from the fact that the success of one generation depends at least partly on the
success of their parents or guardians . . . . The paradox lies in the fact that schools are
supposed to equalize opportunities across generations and to create democratic citizens
out of each generation, but people naturally wish to give their own children an advan-
tage in attaining wealth or power, and some can do it.”); SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES
OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM (2004).
14. Eyes on the Prize: America’s Civil Rights Years — Fighting Back, Blackside (1987).
15. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (hereinafter “Brown II ”).
16. “When asked to explain his view of ‘all deliberate speed,’ Thurgood Marshall
frequently told anyone who would listen that the term meant S-L-O-W.” CHARLES J.
OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 10 (2004).
17. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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Brown.18  As early as the 1970s the Court decided three cases that
significantly undermined the efficacy of that case: Keyes v. School Dis-
trict No. 1,19 which required proof of intentional discrimination in
desegregation suits; San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez,20 which held that vast disparities in the financing of public
education from community to community was constitutionally per-
missible; and Milliken v. Bradley,21 which guaranteed that most de-
segregation plans could not extend to wealthy White suburban
schools.
In those moments, I question the Brown Court’s sincerity and
wonder if the case has been something worse than a failure.  We
know that our public schools are rapidly resegregating22 – what we
cannot know is what opportunities we have ignored during our fifty
year long struggle for integration.23
But, that is not the most troubling thing that I see in Brown.
The most frightening moments for me are those when I remember
that power cannot be made to yield power by encouragement or
legal coercion.  In those moments I fear that integration is, indeed,
a prerequisite to racial justice because it is too easy for politically
and economically disempowered racially isolated people to be sys-
tematically (even if not intentionally) deprived of the resources
necessary to improve their circumstances.  In those moments, I fear
as well that true integration — the coming together of people of
18. See Denise C. Morgan, Reneging on the Promise of Brown: The Rehnquist Court and
Education Rights, in AWAKENING FROM THE DREAM: CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER SEIGE AND THE
NEW STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (Denise C. Morgan, Rachel D. Godsil & Joy Moses
eds., forthcoming Carolina Academic Press 2005).
19. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
20. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
21. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
22. Erica Frankenberg, Chungmei Lee & Gary Orfield, The Civil Rights Project at
Harvard University, A Multiracial Society with Segregated Schools: Are We Losing the Dream?
(2003), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/
AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf.
23. See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 27 (2004) (“By dismissing Plessy without dis-
mantling it, the [Brown] Court might unintentionally predict if not underwrite eventual
failure.”). See generally SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
(Derrick Bell ed. 1980) (attempting to “move school desegregation policies toward al-
ternative visions of what Brown and its promise might still mean for those who need it
most.”). See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 6, at 99 (arguing for a property right to minimally
adequate education).
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different races on equal terms under circumstances that do not re-
quire them to relinquish their cultural specific identities — will
never occur in the United States.  Race relations have changed over
the course of American history, and they will continue to do so, but
it is unlikely that power will ever be made to yield power.
In those moments of despair, I see that many of us have taken
Brown as an invitation to forget.  The case is an invitation to forget
Jim Crow (“systemic racial discrimination is behind us, since Brown,
the world has changed”).24  The case is an invitation to forget the
reality of racism (“people don’t think that way anymore, today most
Americans acknowledge that Brown was rightly decided”).25  The
case is an invitation to forget that our public schools still do not
adequately serve children of color.26  The case is an invitation to
think that race, education, and equality are no longer problems in
America — or to believe that they are someone else’s problems to
fix.
Is Brown dead?  The answer to that question depends on what
you see in the case — but, I hope not.  I hope that the case lives on
in our hearts and minds — inspiring us, daring us, sometimes
threatening us, but always encouraging us to be our better selves.
Rather than celebrating or burying the Court’s decision in Brown, I
would like us to recommit ourselves to living up to the promise of
that case: making democracy real by making equal citizenship and
equal education opportunity real.  It may be that justice is a jour-
ney, not a destination — so we cannot allow despair to turn us back.
“[H]ope is more the consequence of action than its cause.  As the
experience of the spectator favors fatalism, so the experience of the
agent produces hope.”27  Long live Brown!
This symposium issue of the New York Law School Law Review
opens with the speeches delivered by the symposium’s two keynote
24. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DIS-
CRIMINATION LAWS 92 (1992) (describing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as “administering
the final crushing blow to the old order [of Jim Crow].”).
25. See Summary of Polls Conducted on Attitudes Toward Brown v. Board of Education
and Affirmative Action, available at www.brownmatters.org/press_summary.html.
26. See generally Gary Orfield, The Civil Rights Project at Harvard University,
Schools More Separate: Consequences of a Decade of Resegregation (2001), available at http://
www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Schools_More_Separate.pdf.
27. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER & CORNEL WEST, THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN PRO-
GRESSIVISM 11 (1998).
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speakers: Professor Gary Orfield and Professor Derrick Bell.  Both
men are powerful and influential scholars of race and education
law and both men have dedicated their lives to the furtherance of
racial justice — the ultimate goal of Brown.  But, as Professor
Taunya Banks said over dinner the night before the symposium,
they represent “different tensions” that are present in that case.
While they both acknowledge that the promise of Brown remains
unfulfilled, the two men disagree about the reasons the country has
failed to realize integrated schools and racial justice more broadly –
and they disagree about what course the country should take now.
Professor Orfield contends that “[t]he promise of Brown v.
Board of Education in urban America has never been realized be-
cause society has never taken seriously its demand to desegregate
‘with all deliberate speed.’”28  The problem, he contends, is not
with the integration mandate of Brown, but with the Court’s and
society’s implementation of that mandate.  Professor Orfield offers
ample evidence that “school desegregation does actually work, it is
actually durable, and it has been done on a metropolitan scale.”29
In fact, he argues that southern schools integrated rapidly following
the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act: “Within five years, the
South went from almost total apartheid to becoming the most inte-
grated region in the United States and having the most integrated
schools.”30  Our commitment to racial justice was brief; however, as
the Supreme Court began to dismantle desegregation decrees in
the 1990s.  Professor Orfield cautions that the central importance
of Brown’s integration mandate has not diminished.  He contends
that integration is essential to equal educational opportunity by
race because only integration can consistently reduce concentra-
tions of poverty in schools: “if you take the poorest schools and
their highest achievers, they are way below the median of the rich
schools and their relatively low achievers.”31  Segregation, he ar-
gues, is profoundly self-perpetuating because of the “unequal re-
sources, information, networks, and opportunities available to
28. Gary Orfield, Why Segregation Is Inherently Unequal: The Abandonment of Brown
and the Continuing Failure of Plessy, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1041, 1041 (2005).
29. Id. at 1051.
30. Id. at 1043.
31. Id. at 1049.
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those in segregated settings.”32  Rooting out segregation will not be
easy, but Professor Orfield concludes that “integration in middle-
class schools provides substantial benefits for both minority and
white students.”33
Professor Bell, in contrast, argues both that Brown is dead, and
that the case was profoundly misguided from its announcement.
He contends that the Brown decision retarded this country’s pro-
gress toward racial justice because it “reinforced the fiction that the
path of progress was clear.  Everyone could and should succeed
through individual ability and effort.  One would think that this re-
inforcement of the political and economic status quo would have
placated if not pleased even the strongest supporters of segrega-
tion.”34  Rather than celebrating the anniversary of the Brown deci-
sion, Professor Bell seeks to draw lessons for future racial justice
activists from the country’s fifty year long failed experiment with
school integration.  He contends that in hindsight it is clear that
the case was “the definitive example [of interest convergence] that
the interest of blacks in achieving racial justice is accommodated
only when and for so long as policymakers find that the interest of
blacks converges with the political and economic interests of
whites.”35  We are not, however, doomed to repeat what he sees as
the errors of the Civil Rights Era.  Professor Bell counsels that fu-
ture advocates of racial justice must “rely less on judicial decisions,
and more on tactics, actions, even attitudes, that challenge the con-
tinual assumptions of white dominance.”36  Indeed, those advocates
should harness the power of interest convergence to help them
achieve their ends.  Concluding on a note of hope, Professor Bell
urges that “here is a truth that must energize us rather than cause
us despair.  Now we can continue the struggle against racism en-
lightened by what we have learned in the half century since Brown
was decided.”37
32. Id. at 1047-48.
33. Id. at 1051-52.
34. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education, 49
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1053, 1060 (2005).
35. Id. at 1056.
36. Id. at 1064.
37. Id. at 1065.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-4\NLR409.txt unknown Seq: 9  3-MAY-05 15:23
2005] INTRODUCTION 1037
Dennis Parker, the Bureau Chief for the Civil Rights Bureau of
the Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, and
the former head of the Education Litigation Program at the
NAACP LDF, responds to the question posed by the symposium’s
title: “Brown is dead?”  Mr. Parker concedes that “[g]iven the initial
delay in implementing Brown, the relatively short period of its ag-
gressive enforcement, and the accelerating rate of dismissal of ex-
isting cases, the question of the actual impact of [Brown] on the
lives of individuals is an apt one.”38  He argues, however, that the
case is quite vital and that its impact has been felt throughout the
country in large, and small but significant ways.  He contends, for
example, that desegregation cases worked to empower individuals
in small communities and were often the “only means of addressing
the day-to-day concerns of African American students and their par-
ents.”39  Mr. Parker cites desegregation cases that included claims
about “the availability of gifted and talented programs, disparities
in the imposition of discipline, presence on athletic teams or cheer-
leading squads, hiring and promoting of teachers and administra-
tors or color, assignment to special education classes, and indeed
even whether black schools would be saved from closing” as exam-
ples.40  He concludes that the continued existence of the stigma
that Jim Crow segregation visited upon African American students
is not a failure of Brown, but a failure of “the courts and society as a
whole have failed to realize the case’s vast promise.”41
Professor Danielle Holley responds to the question: “Brown is
dead?” with the disheartening fact that fifty years after the case was
decided “a large majority of African American and Latino students
attend segregated schools,”42 and examines the district court uni-
tary status cases that have been decided since the 1990s trilogy of
Supreme Court cases that made it easier for courts to lift desegrega-
tion decrees.43  She notes that significant resegregation followed in
38. Dennis D. Parker, Are Reports of Brown’s Demise Exaggerated? Perspectives of a
School Desegregation Litigator, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1069, 1079 (2005).
39. Id. at 1081.
40. Id. at 1081-82.
41. Id. at 1083.
42. Danielle R. Holley, Is Brown Dying? Exploring the Resegregation Trend in Our Pub-
lic Schools, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1085, 1087 (2005).
43. Dowell v. Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467
(1992); and  Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
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the wake of the declaration of unitary status in thirty-four of the
thirty-eight district court cases and discusses some of the common
factors that contributed to that result.  Finally, Professor Holley sug-
gests strategies to maintain racially diverse student bodies in a legal
climate that is hostile to desegregation.
Professor Rachel Godsil takes up the second topic posed by the
title of the symposium: “Long Live Brown!,” and considers the rele-
vance of that case to environmental justice litigation.  Professor
Godsil contends that both sides of the environmental racism debate
— those who argue that poor Black and Latino communities must
be empowered to better resist the siting of environmental hazards,
and those who respond that the problem is intractable because
Blacks and Latinos “have less power in the market and are thus apt
to ‘come to the nuisance’”44 — assume the continued existence of
racial segregation.  Professor Godsil suggests, however, that “the dis-
proportionate burden of pollution upon segregated communities
of color compels the conclusion that there is a dire need to resusci-
tate Brown and press for implementation of its integrative prom-
ise.”45  Her article invites scholars in the fields of environmental
justice and housing segregation to join in conversation about how
to achieve a “racially integrated society in which environmental bur-
dens are highly concentrated[.]”46
Professor Hiroshi Motomura writes about the relationship be-
tween Brown and immigration law.  Acknowledging that citizens
and non-citizens have different claims on equality rights, he asks,
“how [should] we think about immigrant rights in the context of
civil rights?”47  Professor Motomura offers three different ways of
conceptualizing immigration in the United States: immigration as
contract, in which immigrants are entitled to whatever equality
rights the United States chooses to bestow on them in considera-
tion for the privilege of staying in the country; immigration as affili-
44. Rachel D. Godsil, Environmental Justice and the Ideals of Integration, 49 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (2005) (citing Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses In Minor-
ity Neighborhoods: Disproprtionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383 (1994);
Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios?  A Longitudinal
Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1997)).
45. Id. at 1109.
46. Id. at 1112.
47. Hiroshi Motomura, Brown v. Board of Education, Immigrants and the Meaning
of Equality, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (2005).
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ation, in which immigrants earn equality rights as “they become
enmeshed in the fabric of American life”;48 and immigration as
transition, the dominant way of conceptualizing immigration
through the 1920s.  Immigration as transition presumes the equal-
ity of lawful immigrants and accords them the respect due to future
citizens.  Professor Motomura concludes that if we are to take the
anti-subordination mandate of Brown seriously, we must accept im-
migrants as “Americans-in-waiting” entitled to the equal rights due
to people in transition to becoming citizens.
Professor Penelope Andrews investigates the legacy of Brown
beyond the U.S. borders.  She explains that in 1954, when Brown
was decided, South Africa’s Nationalist Party — which was commit-
ted to white racial supremacy and racial segregation — had recently
come to power.  It would be another forty years, during which time
the majority-Black population would be disenfranchised and any
political opposition to the apartheid regime violently crushed,
before that country would move toward a non-racial democracy.
Professor Andrews contends that during that time, “[t]he rhetorical
power of Brown, seen by many as an unequivocal rejection of no-
tions of racial superiority and racial inferiority, provided succor to
those in South Africa who believed that a societal route towards
racial equality was possible.”49  In addition to being symbolically im-
portant, the legacy of the Brown decision has been practically in-
structive to the South African Constitutional Courts in interpreting
the equality, right to education, and other socio-economic provi-
sions in their constitution.
So, indeed, Brown lives on.  This fact is most apparent in the
student contribution to this volume — an example of the next gen-
eration of lawyers creatively grappling with the ongoing project of
making equal citizenship real.  Victor Suthammanont critically ex-
amines the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Coalition for Economic Equity v.
Wilson upholding Proposition 209’s prohibition of race or sex-based
affirmative action by the State of California.50  He argues that voter
initiatives and legislation prohibiting affirmative action should be
48. Id. at 1149.
49. Penelope E. Andrews, Perspectives on Brown: The South African Experience, 49
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1155, 1156 (2005).
50. Victor Suthammanont, Note, Judicial Notice: How Judicial Bias Impacts the Une-
qual Applications of Equal Protection Principles in Affirmative Action Cases, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
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subject to the same strict scrutiny as other facially neutral legislation
that has a racially invidious motivation.  Moreover, Mr. Suthamma-
nont fashions a new test to determine whether a voter initiative is
motivated by impermissible purposes:
if a state enacted an affirmative action program to redress
past discrimination and made the proper findings of fact
outlining the present effects of discrimination, in order to
end that program, the state should need to show that the
program has achieved the desired results and is no longer
necessary, or has failed and must be discarded or modi-
fied.  This will help rebut a presumption that the state ac-
ted on an unfounded racial stereotype that such
programs are no longer necessary or do not work.51
Such an approach, he argues, will best promote the anti-racism
principles underlying the Equal Protection Clause.
The articles gathered in this volume are an excellent starting
place for those of us on the journey to racial justice who must learn
from the legacy of Brown.
REV. 1173 (2005) (examining Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson 122 F.3d 692
(9th Cir. 1997)).
51. Id. at 1224-25.
